

Anselm's Ontological Argument

Three Propositional Attitudes

Theism

Belief in P

P = "God exists."

Atheism

Disbelief in P

Agnosticism

Withholding judgment about P

Three Philosophical Attitudes

Philosophical Theism

The view that P can be proven

Philosophical Atheism

The view that P can be disproven

Philosophical Agnosticism

The view that P can be neither proven nor disproven

Proofs, Arguments, and Evidence

An **argument** is a set of **statements**; one of which is the **conclusion** and the rest are **premises**; the premises are better known than the conclusion and, if true, give us reason to believe the conclusion.

Arguments are either **deductive** or **inductive**.

A **deductive** argument is **valid** if true premises guarantee a true conclusion.

An **inductive** argument is **strong** if true premises make the conclusion more likely true than false.

Evidence for P gives us some reason for believing P (although it might be an insufficient reason).

A **proof** is often used to mean a deductive argument that is valid and has all true premises, thus guaranteeing the truth of the conclusion.

Proving God's Existence

A priori proofs [ontological]

All of the premises can be known prior to experience.

A posteriori proofs [cosmological, teleological/design]

At least one premise is based on experience.

Proofs of God's Existence

Ontological

The meaning of the word 'God' includes existence.

Cosmological

The existence of the world requires a creator.

Teleological/Design

The purpose/design of the world requires a designer.

Anselm's Idea of God

God is that being than
which none greater can be
conceived.
I think.



Anselm (1033-1109)

Ways of Existing

	<i>in intellectu</i>	<i>in re</i>
physical things	sensations and thoughts of ...	stones, brains, animals, unicorns
non-physical things	thoughts of...	numbers, sensations and thoughts, minds, God?

In intellectu: in the understanding

In re: outside the understanding

Moving from Thought to Being

In intellectu existence (... implies ...) *In re existence*

- | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| (1) Sensation/thought of X. | The real correlate of the sensation or thought. |
| (2) Sensation of X. | The real archetype of X. |
| (3) Thought of X. | The necessary non-existence of the real archetype of X. |
| (4) Thought of X. | The necessary existence of the real archetype of X. |

Real Correlate: this is the real basis of the sensation or thought e.g., as a property of the brain, or of the immaterial soul)

Real Archetype: this is the real thing of which the sensation or thought is a sign, e.g., a visual image of a cow has a cow as its real archetype.

Example of (3): A square-circle. From the thought of a square-circle, we can infer the non-existence of the real archetype (the square circle)

Example of (4): God. This is what Anselm is attempting in his argument. From the thought of God, we can infer the existence of God.

Anselm's 1st Proof

- (1) God is the most perfect being conceivable. [by definition]
- (2) God does not exist *in re*. [assumption for the IP]
- (3) To exist *in re* is to be more perfect than not to exist *in re*.
- (4) It's possible to conceive of a being with all of God's properties, plus existence *in re*.
- (5) ∴ It's possible to conceive of a being more perfect than God. [2, 3, 4]
- (6) But it's *not* possible to conceive of a being more perfect than God. [by def.]
- (7) ∴ (2) is false, i.e. God exists *in re*. [5, 6, 2-IP]

Guanilo's Counter-example

- (1) Insulissima is the most perfect island conceivable. [by definition]
- (2) Insulissima does not exist *in re*. [assumption for the IP]
- (3) To exist *in re* is to be more perfect than not to exist *in re*.
- (4) It's possible to conceive of an island with all of Insulissima's properties, plus existence *in re*.
- (5) \therefore It's possible to conceive of an island more perfect than Insulissima . [2-4]
- (6) But it's *not* possible to conceive of an island more perfect than Insulissima .
- (7) \therefore (2) is false, i.e. Insulissima exists *in re*. [5, 6, 2-IP]

Anselm's 1st Proof

(short version)

- (1) The concept 'God' includes all perfections. [by definition]
- (2) Existence *in re* is a perfection.
- (3) ∴ God exists *in re*. [1, 2]

Anselm's 2nd Proof

- (1) God is the most perfect being conceivable. [by definition]
- (2) God can be conceived not to exist *in re*. [assumption for the IP]
- (3) A thing whose *in re* non-existence cannot be conceived is more perfect than one whose *in re* non-existence can be conceived.
- (4) It's possible to conceive of a being whose *in re* non-existence cannot be conceived.
- (5) ∴ It's possible to conceive of a being more perfect than God. [2, 3, 4]
- (6) But it's *not* possible to conceive of a being more perfect than God. [by def.]
- (7) ∴ (2) is false, i.e. God's non-existence cannot be conceived, i.e., God necessarily exists *in re*. [5, 6, 2-IP]

Anselm's 2nd Proof

(A shorter version)

(1) God is a necessary being.

[implied by the definition]

(2) It is possible that God exists *in re*.

[cf. pr. 4 in the long proof]

(3) \therefore God exists *in re*.

[1, 2]

Criticisms: 1st Proof

Problems with Premises (3) and (4):

(3) To exist *in re* is to be more perfect than not to exist *in re*.

- Is existence a perfection or “great-making” property?
- Is existence a property at all?

(4) It's possible to conceive of a being with all of God's properties, plus existence *in re*.

- Can I conceive of God completely?
- Can I be certain that what I am conceiving is possible?

Criticisms: 2nd Proof

Problems with Premises (3) and (4):

(3) A thing whose *in re* non-existence cannot be conceived is more perfect than one whose *in re* non-existence can be conceived.

- (This does not assume that existence is a property.)

(4) It's possible to conceive of a being whose *in re* non-existence cannot be conceived.

- 'Possible' is ambiguous between "I'm not sure/can't decide if P is true" and "P is possibly true."

Necessity (and contingency)

Logical: It is impossible to conceive of X not existing [necessarily true = true by definition]

Ontological/Metaphysical: X is self-existent; *if* X exists, then X exists necessarily.

Physical/Empirical/Hypothetical: Given the conditions in the actual world, X has to exist or happen. [necessary = actual]

Modality

Modality refers to the quality of being:


- Necessary,
- Actual, or
- Possible.

Also included are the :

- Non-actual (= possible, but not actual)
- Contingent (= possible, but not necessary)
- Impossible (= necessary non-actual)


Modality

- Necessary,
- Actual, or
- Possible.
- Non-necessary
- Non-actual
(= possible,
but not actual)
- Contingent (= actual, but not necessary)
- Impossible



Modality

What if the
actual and the
possible were
the same?



Modality

Would this mean
that everything
that did exist,
had to exist —
that is, that
everything that
is, is necessary?

